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A b s t r a c t. We investigate semantics for an intuitionistic modal
logic in which the “possibility” modality does not distribute over
disjunction. In particular, the main aim of this paper is to study
such intuitionistic modal logic as a variant of classical non-normal
modal logic. We first give a neighborhood semantics together
with a sound and complete axiomatization. Next, we study rela-
tionships between our approach and the relational (Kripke-style)
semantics considered in the literature. It is shown that a rela-
tional model can be represented as a neighborhood model, and
the converse direction holds under a slight restriction. Also, by
considering degenerate cases of neighborhood and relational se-
mantics, we demonstrate that a certain classical monotone modal
logic has relational semantics, and can be embedded into a clas-
sical normal bimodal logic.
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Intuitionistic modal logics that do not admit the “distributivity” law ♦(A∨
B)→ ♦A∨♦B have been considered from several motivations in the litera-
ture. For example, Wijesekera considered such a logic in view of concurrent
dynamic logic [15]. Fairtlough and Mendler introduced the “lax modality”
in view of the application to hardware verification [6]. Kobayashi considered
a constructive S4 in the context of typed lambda-calculus [9], and Kripke
semantics for the same logic has been investigated by Alechina, Mendler,
de Paiva and Ritter [1]. Hilken’s theory of Stone duality for intuitionistic
modal algebras also treats a ♦ operator without distributivity [8].
Semantics for intuitionistic modal logic has been considered mainly in
Kripke-style, but there is a difficulty in such an approach: the usual inter-
pretation of ♦ (and ∨) validates the distributivity. This is roughly because
existential quantification, which is used to interpret ♦ in the meta-level,
distributes over disjunction. So, to avoid the distributivity, we need to
fix the interpretation of ♦ [15, 1]. As a result of such a modification, the
analogy between intuitionistic and classical modal logic is lost; this makes
intuitionistic modal logics harder to understand as a variant of classical
modal logics. For example, consider the correspondences between axioms
and properties of frames. One of the simplest example is the axiom p→ ♦p:
classically this axiom corresponds to reflexivity, but in modified Kripke se-
mantics this would not hold.
In classical setting, it is known that a modality ♦ without distributivity
cannot be handled in the usual Kripke semantics, and such modalities is
said to be non-normal. One of the alternative tools to study such a modal-
ity is neighborhood semantics [11]. However, its intuitionistic version has
not been extensively studied. Although Sotirov [14] and Wijesekera [15]
considers neighborhood semantics for intuitionistic modal logic, it does not
seem that they tried to capture the nature of non-distributive ♦ in terms
of neighborhood semantics. In Sotirov’s work only a necessity modality
is considered, and Wijesekera’s semantics requires some extra axioms for
completeness.
In this paper, we will investigate intuitionistic modal logic without dis-
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tributivity as a non-normal modal logic. This point of view has not been
considered before; in preceding researches, ♦ without distributivity in in-
tuitionistic setting has not been referred to as non-normal. This paper
demonstrates that the neighborhood-style approach, which has been devel-
oped to capture classical non-normal modal logics, is also applicable in the
intuitionistic setting.
.1 2 Overview
In this paper, we will consider neighborhood semantics for intuitionistic
modal logic (which differs from Sotirov’s or Wijesekera’s ones). We will
discuss
1. the relationship between existing relational (Kripke-style) semantics
and our neighborhood semantics, and
2. the classical case of our framework, and the relationship with classical
monotone and bimodal logics.
Relational and neighborhood semantics for intuitionistic modal logic
are basically obtained by adding a preorder (taken from ordinary Kripke
semantics for intuitionistic logic) to the corresponding classical semantics.
So a relational frame is a triple 〈W,≤, R〉, where R is a binary relation,
and a neighborhood frame is a triple 〈W,≤, N 〉, where N is a neighborhood
function, which is a mapping from W to P(P(W )).
For 1, we show that relational and neighborhood semantics are “almost”
equivalent. This is done by defining mutual translations between relational
and neighborhood models. Precisely speaking, not all neighborhood models
have relational representation. What we actually do is to define “normal”
neighborhood models, and show that each normal neighborhood model can
be transformed into an equivalent relational model. The converse direction
is easier: any relational model can be transformed into an equivalent normal
neighborhood model. As an immediate consequence of these translations,
we can see that relational semantics and normal neighborhood semantics
define the same logic.
For 2, we will consider a certain classical monotone modal logic, and
show that it has relational semantics (although it is not in the scope of the
usual Kripke semantics), and it can be embedded into S5 ⊗ K, a classical
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normal bimodal logic with S5 and K modalities. First, we will observe that
a classical neighborhood model for monotone modal logic can be regarded
as a special case of our neighborhood model. This is done by regarding
a classical neighborhood frame 〈W,N 〉 as 〈W,=, N〉. In other words, a
classical neighborhood frame is just an intuitionistic one whose ≤-part is
degenerate. Under this identification, we apply a translation given in 1.
to classical neighborhood models. This derives a relational representation
of classical monotone modal logic. Next, we use the fact that a relational
model is also a model of S5⊗K, which is easy to verify. This observation,
together with the relational representation, induces a translation from clas-
sical monotone modal logic to S5⊗K.
.1 3 Organization of the Paper
In Section 2 we will review existing approaches to intuitionistic modal log-
ics. After listing some basic definitions, we introduce relational semantics
and a sound and complete axiomatization.
Section 3 introduces neighborhood semantics. We first define a neigh-
borhood semantics, and give a sound and complete axiomatization. The
resulting logic is slightly weaker than the logic introduced in Section 2. Af-
ter seeing this, we will define normal neighborhood models, and show that
they determine the same logic as the relational semantics.
In Section 4 we will give translations between relational and normal
neighborhood models, and show that these translations do not change the
interpretation of formulas in an appropriate sense.
In Section 5, we will consider classical modal logic. We first introduce
a neighborhood semantics for a classical monotone modal logic. This logic
turns out to be a classical variant of the logic considered in Section 3.
We will define relational semantics for classical monotone modal logic, and
establish an embedding into a classical bimodal logic S5⊗K.
Finally, in Section 6 we summarize the paper, discuss related work and
make some remarks on informal interpretation of our results.
.1 4 Basic Settings and Notations
Throughout this paper, we use the following notations:
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• PV is a fixed infinite set of propositional variables, and ranged over
by p, q;
• L(O1, . . . , On) is the set of formulas built from PV and ⊥ with logical
connectives ∧,∨,→ and unary modalities O1, . . . , On;
• ¬A is an abbreviation of A→ ⊥.
Mostly we will consider L(,♦) in this paper.
Definition 1.1. 1. A set Λ ⊆ L(,♦) is said to be an L(,♦)-logic
if it contains all intuitionistic tautologies, and closed under uniform
substitution, modus ponens, and necessitation (that is, if A ∈ Λ, then
A ∈ Λ).
2. Let Λ be an L(,♦)-logic. A set Λ′ ⊆ L(,♦) is said to be a Λ-logic
if Λ′ is a L(,♦)-logic and Λ ⊆ Λ′.
3. Let Λ be an L(,♦)-logic. A set Γ ⊆ L(,♦) is said to be a Λ-theory
if it contains Λ and closed under modus ponens.
The following are axioms that will appear in this paper.
(N♦) ♦⊥ → ⊥ (K) (p→ q)→ p→ q
(N♦) ¬♦⊥ (K♦) (p→ q)→ ♦p→ ♦q
(PEM) p ∨ ¬p
Definition 1.2. The L(,♦)-logic IM is the least logic containing K
and K♦
Definition 1.3. Let A be a formula, and Λ be an IM-logic. We define
Λ +A as the smallest Λ-logic containing A.
.2 Relational Semantics
.2 1 Existing Relational Approaches
There have been several approaches to define a Kripke-style semantics for
intuitionistic modal logic. Most of them are obtained by introducing an
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extra structure into the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic. Below we
will consider a triple 〈W,≤, R〉.1 Here ≤ and R are taken from the Kripke
semantics for intuitionistic logic and modal logic, respectively.
A problem in introducing modalities in this way is that the ordinary
truth conditions for modalities
x  A ⇐⇒ ∀y. (x R y =⇒ y  A),
x  ♦A ⇐⇒ ∃y. (x R y and y  A)
breaks the heredity condition
x ≤ y and x  A =⇒ y  A,
which is expected in the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic.
Several solutions to this problem have been proposed in the literature.
Roughly speaking, there are two approaches:
1. consider an alternative truth condition, and
2. impose some conditions on ≤ and R,
for each of  and ♦. For example, Plotkin and Stirling [12] consider 1. for 
and 2. for ♦. This approach results in a logic which admits the distributivity
of ♦ over disjunction. Wolter and Zakharyaschev [16] consider 2. for  and
1. for ♦. In this approach, although the distributivity can be rejected, the
duality ♦A ↔ ¬¬A becomes a theorem. Since this is not necessarily
natural in intuitionistic setting, we take another approach; we will consider
2. for both  and ♦. We will define
x  A ⇐⇒ ∀z ≥ x. ∀y. (z R y =⇒ y  A),
x  ♦A ⇐⇒ ∀z ≥ x. ∃y. (z R y and y  A).
This is the choice often taken in the previous literature to model a♦ without
distributivity [15, 6, 1].
The above truth condition for ♦ may look strange, because it breaks the
analogy between ♦ and ∃. Actually, a ♦ modality without distributivity
1Another approach often seen in the literature is to consider first-order Kripke struc-
ture, and interpret  and ♦ as ∀ and ∃ in it. This approach has been considered by
Ewald [5] and Simpson [13], for example.
Publikacja objęta jest prawem autorskim. Wszelkie prawa zastrzeżone. Kopiowanie i rozpowszechnianie zabronione.  
Publikacja przeznaczona jedynie dla klientów indywidualnych. Zakaz rozpowszechniania i udostępniania serwisach bibliotecznych
RELATIONAL AND NEIGHBORHOOD SEMANTICS 93
cannot be interpreted as ∃, because ∃x.(P (x) ∨Q(x)) implies (∃x.P (x)) ∨
(∃x.Q(x)) in intuitionistic first-order logic.
Below, we will summarize known results on the relational semantics for
intuitionistic modal logic based on this approach. Basically the contents of
the rest of this section is a propositional fragment of Wijesekera’s work [15].
.2 2 Definition of Relational Semantics
Definition 2.1. An intuitionistic relational frame is a triple 〈W,≤, R〉
of a non-empty set W , a preorder ≤ on W , and a binary relation R on W .
Definition 2.2. 1. For an intuitionistic relational frameR = 〈W,≤, R〉,
an R-valuation is a map V from PV to P(W ).
2. An R-valuation V is said to be admissible if V (p) is upward-closed
for all propositional variables p.
Definition 2.3. An intuitionistic relational model is a pair 〈R, V 〉 of
an intuitionistic relational frame R and an admissible R-valuation V .
Definition 2.4. Let 〈R, V 〉 be an intuitionistic relational model. We
can define the satisfaction relation, denoted by r, as follows:
R, V, x r p ⇐⇒ x ∈ V (p);
R, V, x r A ∧B ⇐⇒ R, V, x r A and R, V, x r B;
R, V, x r A ∨B ⇐⇒ R, V, x r A or R, V, x r B;
R, V, x r A→ B ⇐⇒ ∀y ≥ x.(R, V, y r A =⇒ R, V, y r B);
R, V, x r A ⇐⇒ ∀y ≥ x.∀z.(y R z =⇒ R, V, z r A);
R, V, x r ♦A ⇐⇒ ∀y ≥ x.∃z.(y R z and R, V, z r A).
Below we sometimes suppress R and V if they are clear from the context.
It is easy to verify that the heredity condition
R, V, x r A and x ≤ y =⇒ R, V, y r A
holds for all formulas A ∈ L(,♦).
Definition 2.5. Let A be a formula in L(,♦).
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1. Let 〈R, V 〉 be an intuitionistic relational model. A is said to be true
in 〈R, V 〉 if R, V, x r A for all x ∈W .
2. Let K be a class of intuitionistic relational models. A is said to be
true in K if it is true in all models of K.
Theorem 2.6 (Soundness and Completeness). A ∈ L(,♦) is a the-
orem of IM + N♦ if and only if A is true in all intuitionistic relational
models.
Soundness is proved by routine induction, and the completeness can
be proved by canonical model construction (we omit the details). Another
proof using completeness for neighborhood semantics can be found at the
end of Section 4.
.3 Neighborhood Semantics
.3 1 Definition of Neighborhood Semantics
Classically a neighborhood frame is given by a pair 〈W,N 〉, where W is a
set of possible worlds and N is a map from W to P(P(W ))[4, Part III]. We
call N a neighborhood function. Here we consider its intuitionistic version,
so we introduce additional relation ≤ to model intuitionistic behavior.
Definition 3.1. An intuitionistic neighborhood frame is a triple 〈W,≤, N 〉
of a non-empty set W , a preorder ≤ on W , and a mapping N : W →
P(P(W )) that satisfies the decreasing condition:
x ≤ y =⇒ N(x) ⊇ N(y).
The notion of valuation is defined in the same way as the relational
case.
Definition 3.2. For an intuitionistic neighborhood frameN = 〈W,≤, N 〉,
an N -valuation is a map V from PV to P(W ). An N -valuation V is said
to be admissible if V (p) is upward-closed for all p ∈ PV.
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Definition 3.3. An intuitionistic neighborhood model is a pair 〈N , V 〉
of an intuitionistic neighborhood frame N and an admissible N -valuation
V .
Definition 3.4. Given an intuitionistic neighborhood model 〈N , V 〉,
we can define the satisfaction relation, denoted by n, in the same way as
in the relational case, except that the truth conditions of modalities read
N , V, x n A ⇐⇒ ∀X ∈ N(x).∀y ∈ X.N , V, y n A;
N , V, x n ♦A ⇐⇒ ∀X ∈ N(x).∃y ∈ X.N , V, y n A.
(1)
The notion of truth in a model and a class of models is defined in the
same way as Definition 2.5.
Remark 3.5. The conditions (1) are different from the ones in the
usual neighborhood semantics, which read
N , V, x n A ⇐⇒ ∃X ∈ N(x).∀y.(y ∈ X ⇐⇒ N , V, y n A);
N , V, x n ♦A ⇐⇒ ∀X ∈ N(x).∃y.¬(y /∈ X ⇐⇒ N , V, y n A).
(2)
This difference is motivated from our goal, that is, to establish a model of
modal logic with normal  and non-normal ♦. In particular, unlike the
usual classical modal logic,  and ♦ cannot be each other’s dual.
.3 2 Sound and Complete Axiomatization
The proof system presented in the previous section is not sound for the
neighborhood semantics introduced above, because the axiom N♦ (♦⊥ →
⊥) is not necessarily true in all intuitionistic neighborhood models (for a
counterexample, see Lemma 3.8). However, we can establish a sound and
complete axiomatization by slightly modifying this axiom.
Theorem 3.6 (Soundness and Completeness). A ∈ L(,♦) is a theo-
rem of IM+ N♦ if and only if A is true in all intuitionistic neighborhood
models.
Proof. “Only if” part is proved in the usual way. For the converse
direction, see Appendix A. 
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.3 3 Normal Worlds
Although the logic determined by the neighborhood semantics introduced
above does not coincide with the logic of relational semantics, we can find
a class of intuitionistic neighborhood frames that characterizes the logic of
relational semantics.
First, we introduce the notion of normal worlds, at which the axiom N♦
holds.
Definition 3.7. Let N = 〈W,≤, N 〉 be an intuitionistic neighborhood
frame.
1. A possible world x ∈W is said to be normal if N(x) 6= ∅.
2. N is said to be normal if every world x ∈W is normal.
3. An intuitionistic neighborhood model 〈N , V 〉 is said to be normal if
N is normal.
The main observation is the following lemma.
Lemma 3.8. Let 〈N , V 〉 be an intuitionistic neighborhood model. Then,
a world x ∈ W is normal if and only if it satisfies N , V, x n ¬♦⊥ (not
depending on the choice of V ).
Theorem 3.9. A formula A is a theorem of IM+N♦ if and only if A
is true in all normal intuitionistic neighborhood models.
Proof. “Only if” part is verified from the previous lemma and Theo-
rem 3.6. For the converse direction, see Appendix A. 
.4 Translations Between the Two Semantics
In the previous section, we have developed a neighborhood semantics for
intuitionistic modal logic, and observed that normal neighborhood frames
correspond to the logic determined by relational semantics. In this sec-
tion, we will give mutual translations between relational models and normal
neighborhood models.
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We first consider a translation from relational to normal neighborhood
models, and then we consider the converse direction. Both of the trans-
lations are proved to “preserve semantics” in an appropriate sense. These
translations explicitly relate relational and neighborhood approach.
.4 1 From Relational to Neighborhood Semantics
Definition 4.1. LetR = 〈W,≤, R〉 be an intuitionistic relational frame.
Then we define the intuitionistic neighborhood frame induced from R to
be the tuple NR = 〈W,≤, NR〉, where
NR(x) = {R [y] | y ≥ x} , where R [y] = {z | y R z}.
It is easy to check that NR is indeed an intuitionistic neighborhood
frame for any intuitionistic relational frameR. Additionally, anR-valuation
and anNR-valuation are the same thing since they are both a mapping from
PV to P(W ). Admissibility of these valuations also coincide, since R and
NR has the same preorder structure. To summarize, the following lemma
holds:
Lemma 4.2. Let 〈R, V 〉 be an intuitionistic relational model. Then
〈NR, V 〉 is a normal intuitionistic neighborhood model.
Theorem 4.3. Let 〈R, V 〉 be an intuitionistic relational model. Then,
R, V, x r A ⇐⇒ NR, V, x n A.
Proof. By induction on A. 
.4 2 From Neighborhood to Relational Semantics
Definition 4.4. Let N = 〈W,≤, N 〉 be an intuitionistic neighborhood
frame. Then we define an intuitionistic relational frame induced from N
as a tuple RN = 〈W
∗,≤∗,3∗〉, where
W ∗ = {(x,X) | x ∈W,X ∈ N(x)} ;
(x,X) ≤∗ (y, Y ) ⇐⇒ x ≤ y;
(x,X) 3∗ (y, Y ) ⇐⇒ y ∈ X.
(3)
Publikacja objęta jest prawem autorskim. Wszelkie prawa zastrzeżone. Kopiowanie i rozpowszechnianie zabronione.  
Publikacja przeznaczona jedynie dla klientów indywidualnych. Zakaz rozpowszechniania i udostępniania serwisach bibliotecznych
98 KENSUKE KOJIMA
It is clear that RN is an intuitionistic relational frame for any intuition-
istic neighborhood frame N . This time, unlike the previous case, we need
a little more consideration on valuations, since the set of possible worlds
has been changed.
Definition 4.5. Let N be an intuitionistic neighborhood frame, and
V an N -valuation. Then we define an RN -valuation V
∗ by
V ∗(p) = {(x,X) ∈W ∗ | x ∈ V (p)} .
Lemma 4.6. Let N be an intuitionistic neighborhood frame, and V an
N -valuation. If V is admissible, then V ∗ is admissible. Therefore, if 〈N , V 〉
is an intuitionistic neighborhood model, then 〈RN , V
∗〉 is an intuitionistic
relational model.
If N is normal, this transformation preserves semantics in the following
sense:
Theorem 4.7. Let 〈N , V 〉 be a normal intuitionistic neighborhood model.
Then the following are equivalent:
1. N , V, x n A;
2. RN , V
∗, (x,X) r A for all X ∈ N(x);
3. RN , V
∗, (x,X) r A for some X ∈ N(x).
Proof. By induction on A. 
Now, Theorem 2.6 can be proved as follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.6. By Theorem 3.9, a formula A ∈ L(,♦) is
a theorem of IM + N♦ if and only if A is valid in all normal intuitionistic
neighborhood models. So it suffices to see that A is true in all intuition-
istic relational models if and only if A is true in all normal intuitionistic
neighborhood models. “If” part follows from Theorem 4.3, and “only if”
part follows from Theorem 4.7. 
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.5 Application to the Classical Case
In the previous section, we have investigated the relationship between re-
lational and neighborhood semantics. In this section, we apply the trans-
lation given above to the classical setting. As a result, we can obtain a
relational representation of neighborhood semantics for classical monotone
modal logics. Also, as a consequence of this representation, we show that
there is an embedding from classical monotone modal logic IM+PEM+N♦
to a certain classical bimodal logic.
.5 1 Classical Monotone Modalities
First of all, we briefly introduce classical modal logic with both normal and
non-normal modalities. The formulation here is basically taken from the
course note by Pacuit [11].
We consider the language L([ ], [ 〉, 〈 ], 〈 〉).
Definition 5.1. A classical neighborhood frame is a pair 〈W,N 〉, where
W is a non-empty set and N is a map fromW to P(P(W )) (a neighborhood
function).
Definition 5.2. For a classical neighborhood frame N = 〈W,N 〉, an
N -valuation is a map from PV to P(W ). A classical neighborhood model
is a pair 〈N , V 〉 of a classical neighborhood frame N and an N -valuation
V .
In a similar way to the intuitionistic case, we can define the truth of
formulas by the following clauses:
N , V, x  [ ]A ⇐⇒ ∀X ∈ N(x).∀y ∈ X.N , V, y  A;
N , V, x  [ 〉A ⇐⇒ ∀X ∈ N(x).∃y ∈ X.N , V, y  A;
N , V, x  〈 ]A ⇐⇒ ∃X ∈ N(x).∀y ∈ X.N , V, y  A;
N , V, x  〈 〉A ⇐⇒ ∃X ∈ N(x).∃y ∈ X.N , V, y  A.
Propositional connectives are interpreted in the same way as the usual
classical modal logic.
Remark 5.3. 1. 〈 ] and [ 〉 can be regarded as  and ♦ in classical
monotone modal logics. So the L(〈 ], [ 〉)-fragment of the logic above
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is essentially the classical monotone modal logic, often called M or
EM[4, Section 8.2].
2. [ ] and 〈 〉 are  and ♦ in normal modal logic, that is, they satisfy
the following axioms:
[ ](p→ p), [ ](p→ q)→ [ ]p→ [ ]q,
¬〈 〉⊥, 〈 〉(p ∨ q)→ 〈 〉p ∨ 〈 〉q.
Therefore, the L([ ], 〈 〉)-fragment of the logic above is the minimal
normal modal logic K.
.5 2 Relational Semantics for the Classical Setting
The classical modal logic defined above can be regarded as a special case of
the neighborhood semantics defined in Section 3. This fact, combined with
the result of Section 4, suggests that we can define a relational semantics
for a monotone modal logic. Below we will see how to define relational
semantics for the classical monotone modal logic introduced in the previous
part of the current section.
Remark 5.4. The semantics on classical neighborhood frame 〈W,N 〉
introduced in this section coincides with the semantics on 〈W,=, N〉 defined
in Section 3.
To see this, we have to identify formulas of L([ ], [ 〉, 〈 ], 〈 〉) and of
L(,♦), and regard a classical neighborhood model as an intuitionistic
neighborhood model.
First, we translate formulas from L([ ], [ 〉, 〈 ], 〈 〉) to L(,♦) being based
on the observation in Remark 5.3. We translate [ ] and [ 〉 into  and ♦,
respectively. Other two modalities 〈 ] and 〈 〉 are duals of [ 〉 and [ ], so it
can be translated into ¬♦¬ and ¬¬, respectively.
As for models, we can regard 〈W,N 〉 as 〈W,=, N 〉, where = is the
equality on the set W . Since any valuation is admissible in 〈W,=, N 〉,
valuations on 〈W,N 〉 and valuations on 〈W,=, N 〉 are the same. It is easy
to see that
〈W,N 〉, V, x  A ⇐⇒ 〈W,=, N 〉, V, x n A
′,
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where A ∈ L([ ], [ 〉, 〈 ], 〈 〉), and A′ ∈ L(,♦) is its correspondent (as
described above).
Based on this observation, in what follows, we consider [ ] and [ 〉 as the
only primitive modalities, and denote them by  and ♦.
Let 〈W,N 〉 be a classical neighborhood frame, and regard this as 〈W,=, N 〉.
Then we can apply the transformation (3) to obtain 〈W ∗,≤∗,3∗〉. Here ≤∗
is given by
(x,X) ≤∗ (y, Y ) ⇐⇒ x = y,
so ≤∗ becomes an equivalence relation.
The definition of the interpretation of formulas is the same as in Sec-
tion 2. Since ≤∗ is an equivalence relation, and an interpretation is hered-
itary, the semantics is defined modulo this equivalence.
By abstracting these observations, we obtain the following definition.
Definition 5.5. An intuitionistic relational frame 〈W,', R〉 is said to
be degenerate if ' is an equivalence relation on W .
Definition 5.6. An intuitionistic relational model 〈R, V 〉 is said to be
degenerate if R is degenerate.
Since degenerate intuitionistic relational frame is just a special case
of intuitionistic relational frame, we can interpret modal formulas in this
frame in the same way as the intuitionistic case.
Sound and complete axiomatization is obtained by adding the principle
of excluded middle to the intuitionistic case.
Theorem 5.7. A formula A ∈ L(,♦) is a theorem in IM+PEM+N♦
if and only if A is true in all degenerate intuitionistic relational models.
.5 3 An Embedding into S5⊗K
A relational semantics for monotone modal logic given above suggests that
the monotone modal logic can be embedded into a normal bimodal logic.
Since a degenerate intuitionistic relational frame has two binary relations
corresponding to S5 and K, it is natural to think of a translation from the
monotone logic to a bimodal logic obtained by combining S5 and K.
To formalize this idea, we first determine the translation image, which
we call S5⊗K.
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A frame for S5⊗ K is just a degenerate intuitionistic relational frame.
However, a notion of valuation is not the same.
Definition 5.8. An (S5 ⊗ K)-model is a pair 〈R, V 〉 of a degenerate
intuitionistic relational frame and a (not necessarily admissible) valuation
V .
Given an (S5⊗K)-model, we can define a satisfaction relation, denoted
by b. The boolean connectives are interpreted in the usual way, and
modalities are interpreted as follows:
R, V, x b 1A ⇐⇒ ∀y.(x ' y =⇒ R, V, y b A);
R, V, x b 2A ⇐⇒ ∀y.(x R y =⇒ R, V, y b A).
Proposition 5.9. The logic S5 ⊗ K is axiomatized by the following
axioms and inference rules:
• modus ponens;
• necessitation for both 1 and 2;
• classical tautology instances;
• axioms K, T, and 5 for 1;
• axiom K for 2.
Proof. By the canonical model construction [3, Section 4.2]. 
Now we can define the translation from L(,♦) to L(1,2).
Definition 5.10. For each A ∈ L(,♦), define |A| as follows:
|p| = 1p; |⊥| = 1⊥;
|A ∗B| = |A| ∗ |B| ; (∗ is either ∧, ∨, or →)
|A| = 12 |A| ; |♦A| = 1♦2 |A| .
Definition 5.11. Let V be a valuation on a degenerate intuitionistic
relational frame. Then its admissible variant, denoted by V ◦, is defined by
V ◦(p) = {x | ∀y ' x. y ∈ V (p)} .
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Lemma 5.12. For all formulas A ∈ L(,♦) and a valuation V ,
R, V, x b |A| ⇐⇒ R, V
◦, x b |A| ⇐⇒ R, V
◦, x r A.
Proof. By induction on A. 
Theorem 5.13. Let A ∈ L(,♦). Then, A is true in all degenerate
intuitionistic relational models if and only if |A| is true in all (S5 ⊗ K)-
models.
Proof.
Let us write R, V r A if R, V, x r A for all x, and similarly for
R, V b A. Then the condition
A is true in all degenerate intuitionistic relational models
is rephrased as
R, V r A for any R and admissible V ,
where R ranges over all degenerate intuitionistic relational frames, and V
ranges over all R-valuations. This is equivalent to
R, V ◦ r A for any R and (not necessarily admissible) V ,
since V ◦ is admissible for every V , and every admissible valuation V is an
admissible variant of some valuation (because V = V ◦ if V is admissible).
By using the previous lemma, we can rewrite this condition into
R, V b |A| for any R and (not necessarily admissible) V ,
and this is the same as
|A| is true in all (S5⊗K)-models.

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We have investigated semantic aspects of intuitionistic modal logics without
distributivity law ♦(A ∨ B) → ♦A ∨ ♦B. We have defined neighborhood
semantics, and proved that the existing relational semantics can be repre-
sented in terms of neighborhood semantics, as well as the converse under
a slight restriction. This shows a close relationship between these two se-
mantics.
By using this result, we have also considered the relationship between
classical monotone modal logic and normal bimodal logic. We proved that
the classical monotone modal logic with N♦ has relational representation
of its neighborhood semantics, and embeddable into S5⊗K.
The results obtained from these investigations bring us a new insight
in intuitionistic modal logic and classical non-normal modal logic. In par-
ticular, it turned out that (some of) the existing intuitionistic modal logic
can actually be captured as an intuitionistic version of non-normal modal
logic in a natural way.
.6 2 Non-Normal Modalities and Multimodal Logics
Translation from non-normal modal logics to normal multimodal logics has
already been studied before. Gasquet and Herzig showed that non-normal
(not necessarily monotone) modal logic can be translated into normal modal
logic with three modalities [7]. Kracht and Wolter proved that monotone
modal logic can be “simulated” by normal bimodal logic (actually, they
also proved that a normal monomodal logic can simulate monotone modal
logics) [10].
The basic idea behind their work is different from ours. Our translation
from monotone to bimodal logic is based on the idea of considering the set
W ∗ = {(x,X) | x ∈W,X ∈ N(x)} ,
which consists of all pairs of possible worlds and their neighborhoods. On
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which consists of all possible worlds and all subsets of W that are neigh-
borhoods of some worlds.2
This causes the difference in source and target logics of translations. In
our translation, both of the source and target are stronger logics than the
previous work. We assume the axiom N♦ in the source logic, and considered
S5⊗K, a combination of S5 and K, as a target. In the previous work, they
did not assume an extra axiom like N♦, and the target is a combination
of two (in the case of Kracht and Wolter) or three (in the case of Gasquet
and Herzig) copies of K.
.6 3 Relationship with Go¨del Translation
Our translation from monotone modal logic to S5⊗K can be considered as
a variant of Go¨del translation. Wolter and Zakharyaschev [16] investigated
an embedding from intuitionistic modal logic into classical normal bimodal
logic. They defined a Go¨del-style translation, denoted by t, from an intu-
itionistic modal logic (with  as the only primitive modality) into S4⊗K.
Our translation |·| can be seen as a variant of theirs.
At first sight, there is a difference between these two translations in the
case of implication. Wolter and Zakharyaschev’s t is defined as
t(A→ B) = 1(t(A)→ t(B)),
which is the same as the usual Go¨del translation, while our version |·| is
given by
|A→ B| = |A| → |B| .
However, when 1 is an S5 modality, this makes no difference; we can prove
that |A| → |B| and 1(|A| → |B|) are equivalent in S5⊗K.
2Actually, Kracht and Wolter used more sophisticated technique, but the basic idea
is as described here.
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.6 4 ”Internal Observer” Interpretation
One possible interpretation that rejects the distributivity is to consider
observers inside possible worlds, which we call “internal observer.” Let us
assume that an observer ox is assigned to each possible world x. We will
consider a formula A true at a world x if the observer ox is able to verify
that A is true.
♦(A∨B) at xmeans that an observer ox knows A∨B is true somewhere,
say y. Note that this does not necessarily mean that ox can determine the
disjunct that becomes true at y. It is oy who can know which of A and
B is actually true at y. This means that, in view of ox, neither ♦A nor
♦B cannot be verified to be true. Therefore ♦(A∨B) does not necessarily
imply ♦A∨♦B, and this is why the internal observer interpretation rejects
distributivity.
In the usual Kripke semantics, unlike this interpretation, we implicitly
assume a viewpoint of an observer outside the Kripke frame. So we can say
that it takes an external observer’s viewpoint. The argument above would
not be true if we take this point of view, and the distributivity cannot be
rejected (indeed, the usual Kripke semantics admits distributivity).
Similar viewpoint can be found in Aucher’s work on internal (and imper-
fect external) epistemic logic [2]. He investigated an epistemic logic based
on the view from inside the situation, rather than the usual view from
outside the situation. To model such a circumstance, Aucher considered
disjoint sum of several Kripke models.
.6 5 Neighborhoods as Ambiguity
The interpretation discussed above is partially expressed in neighborhood
semantics. An internal observer ox does not have complete information
about other worlds, so ox has several possibilities in mind about the actual
situation of other worlds. Each of these possible situations is represented
as a neighborhood. For example, in the situation above (ox can verify
♦(A ∨ B) but not ♦A ∨ ♦B), ox would think of two possibilities about
the sets of accessible worlds (which we call X and X ′). In X a world that
makes A true can be found, and X ′ contain a world that makes B true.
This uncertainty can be expressed in terms of neighborhoods, that is, each
neighborhood of x represents a possible set of accessible worlds from x in
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view of ox. Incidentally, the decreasing condition on neighborhood function
is understood as a natural assumption that the amount of uncertainty would
decrease if the amount of knowledge increases.
Another way to express this uncertainty is to consider a pair (x,X),
where x is a possible world, and X is a candidate of the set of accessible
worlds from x. This construction is precisely what we did to transform
a neighborhood model into a relational model. So the notion of possible
worlds in relational semantics actually carries two pieces of information,
the current state of knowledge and the set of accessible worlds.
A similar idea can be found in Hilken’s work [8], which investigates
Stone duality for modal frames (a complete Heyting algebras equipped
with modal operators). In his theory, the notion of points in modal frames
contains two components; a completely prime filter p and an element a of
the frame such that ♦a /∈ p.3 The first component p is the same as the
notion of point appearing in the duality theory between frames and spaces.
The second component a carries an extra piece of information; intuitively,
this is (the interior of) the set of points that are not accessible from the
point (p, a) represents.
As we have seen above, a kind of uncertainty plays an important role in
the semantics of intuitionistic modal logic we have considered in this paper
(and the existing literature). This is the source of the difficulty when we try
to capture intuitionistic modal logics in the framework of Kripke semantics,
which is originally a framework for normal modal logics. What we have
presented in this paper is that intuitionistic modal logics can be treated as
non-normal modal logics rather than normal ones. We believe this finding
advances our understanding of intuitionistic modal logics.
.A . Proof of Completeness
Soundness can be checked by the standard induction, so we will prove the
completeness only. The basic strategy of the proof is the same as the one
found in Section 4 of [3], except that we consider neighborhood frames
instead of relational frames.
3Precisely speaking, Hilken calls such a pair “pre-point,” and defines the set of points
as a certain subset of the set of all pre-points.
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Lemma A.1 (deduction theorem). Let Λ be an L(,♦)-logic and Γ a
Λ-theory. Then, A → B ∈ Γ if and only if all Λ-theories ∆ containing Γ
and A contain B.
Proof. To prove “if” part, let ∆ = {C | A→ C ∈ Γ}. Then ∆ is a
theory containing Γ and A. Then, from assumption, ∆ contains B, and
this means A→ B ∈ Γ by definition of ∆.
For the “only if” part, use the fact that any theory is closed under
modus ponens. 
Definition A.2. Let Λ be an L(,♦)-logic and Γ a Λ-theory. Γ is said
to be prime if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. if A ∨B ∈ Γ, then either A ∈ Γ or B ∈ Γ;
2. ⊥ /∈ Γ.
Lemma A.3 (extension lemma). Let Λ be an L(,♦)-logic and Γ a
Λ-theory not containing A. Then, there exists a prime Λ-theory ∆ such
that A /∈ ∆ and Γ ⊆ ∆.
Proof. A maximal element of {∆ | Γ ⊆ ∆, A /∈ ∆} has the required
property. 
Definition A.4. Let Λ be an L(,♦)-logic and Γ a Λ-theory. Then
we define −1 Γ := {A | A ∈ Γ}.
Lemma A.5. Let Λ be an L(,♦)-logic containing axiom K. If Γ is a
Λ-theory, then so is −1 Γ.
Proof. If A → B ∈ −1 Γ and A ∈ −1 Γ, then (A → B) ∈ Γ and
A ∈ Γ. Since Λ contains K, it follows that B ∈ Γ, hence B ∈ −1 Γ. So

−1 Γ is closed under modus ponens. 
Below, we will construct a canonical model for a logic Λ and prove
standard properties. In what follows, we fix an arbitrary L(,♦)-logic Λ
containing IM + N♦.
Definition A.6 (canonical neighborhood frame). We define NΛ to be
a tuple 〈WΛ,≤Λ, NΛ〉, where
• WΛ is the set of all prime Λ-theories,
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• ≤Λ is the inclusion relation between sets, and










∣∣ −1 Γ ⊆ ∆ and A /∈ ∆
}
for each Γ ∈WΛ.
Definition A.7 (canonical valuation). A valuation V Λ onNΛ is defined
by
V Λ(p) = {Γ | p ∈ Γ} .
Definition A.8 (canonical model). Clearly V Λ is admissible, soMΛ =
〈NΛ, V Λ〉 is an intuitionistic neighborhood model. We call this model a
canonical model for Λ.
As usual, the following holds.
Theorem A.9. NΛ, V Λ,Γ n A if and only if A ∈ Γ.
Proof. We proceed by induction on A. The cases when A is an atomic
formula, ⊥, conjunction, and disjunction are trivial.
A→ B ∈ Γ =⇒ NΛ, V Λ,Γ n A→ B: For all ∆ ≥
Λ Γ, if NΛ, V Λ,∆ n
A, then A ∈ ∆ by induction hypothesis, so A,A → B ∈ ∆. Since ∆
is closed under modus ponens, we obtain B ∈ ∆. This means that
NΛ, V Λ,Γ n B by induction hypothesis.
A→ B /∈ Γ =⇒ NΛ, V Λ,Γ 6n A→ B: Suppose A → B /∈ Γ. Then, by
deduction theorem and extension lemma, there exists ∆ ∈ WΛ such
that A ∈ ∆, Γ ⊆ ∆, and B /∈ ∆. So NΛ, V Λ,Γ 6n A→ B.
A ∈ Γ =⇒ NΛ, V Λ,Γ n A: If ∆ ∈ n(Γ
′, B) ∈ NΛ(Γ) for some Γ′
and B, then −1 Γ ⊆ −1 Γ′ ⊆ ∆. Since A ∈ Γ, we have A ∈

−1 Γ ⊆ ∆. Therefore NΛ, V Λ,∆ n A. Since this holds for all Γ′,
B and ∆, it follows that NΛ, V Λ,Γ n A.
A /∈ Γ =⇒ NΛ, V Λ,Γ 6n A: First, note that A /∈ Γ means ♦⊥ /∈ Γ,
since
♦⊥ → ⊥,⊥ → A ∈ Γ
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from N♦ and the monotonicity of . This means that n(Γ,⊥) ∈
NΛ(Γ). So it suffices to show that n(Γ,⊥) contains some ∆ such
that A /∈ ∆. Such ∆ can be obtained as follows. Since A /∈ Γ,
we have A /∈ −1 Γ. By using extension lemma we can obtain a
prime Λ-theory ∆ ⊇ −1 Γ with A /∈ ∆. For such ∆, it holds that
∆ ∈ n(Γ,⊥).
♦A ∈ Γ =⇒ NΛ, V Λ,Γ n ♦A: Take an arbitrary n(Γ
′, B) ∈ NΛ(Γ). Then
we have ♦B /∈ Γ′. Let Θ be the least theory containing −1 Γ′ and
A.
We first show that B /∈ Θ. If B ∈ Θ, then we would have A → B ∈

−1 Γ′ from deduction theorem. This means (A → B) ∈ Γ′, hence
♦A→ ♦B ∈ Γ′ since
(A→ B)→ ♦A→ ♦B ∈ Γ′.
However, ♦A ∈ Γ ⊆ Γ′ from assumption, so it follows that ♦B ∈ Γ′,
a contradiction.
Now we have −1 Γ′ ⊆ Θ, A ∈ Θ, and B /∈ Θ. By extension lemma,
there exists ∆ satisfying the same conditions. For such ∆, we have
∆ ∈ n(Γ′, B), and A ∈ ∆, and hence NΛ, V Λ,∆ n A.
So we have proved that for all neighborhood n(Γ′, B) of Γ there
exists ∆ ∈ n(Γ′, B) such that NΛ, V Λ,∆ n A. This means that
NΛ, V Λ,Γ n ♦A.
♦A /∈ Γ =⇒ NΛ, V Λ,Γ 6n ♦A: Assume ♦A /∈ Γ, and let X = n(Γ, A).
Clearly X is a neighborhood of Γ, and any of its element ∆ does
not contain A. This means that NΛ, V Λ,∆ 6n A for all ∆ ∈ X.
Therefore NΛ, V Λ,Γ 6n ♦A.

The following is an easy consequence of this theorem.
Lemma A.10. Let K be a class of intuitionistic neighborhood models.
If MΛ ∈ K, then Λ is complete with respect to K, that is, any formula true
in K is a theorem of Λ.
By using this lemma, the completeness parts of Theorem 3.6 and The-
orem 3.9 can be reduced to the following lemma, which is easily verified.
Publikacja objęta jest prawem autorskim. Wszelkie prawa zastrzeżone. Kopiowanie i rozpowszechnianie zabronione.  
Publikacja przeznaczona jedynie dla klientów indywidualnych. Zakaz rozpowszechniania i udostępniania serwisach bibliotecznych
RELATIONAL AND NEIGHBORHOOD SEMANTICS 111
Lemma A.11. 1. The canonical model of IM+N♦ is an intuition-
istic neighborhood model.
2. The canonical model of IM+N♦ is a normal intuitionistic neighbor-
hood model.
Proof. The first claim is immediate from the definition of NΛ. For the
second part, it suffices to show that N IM+N♦(Γ) 6= ∅ for each Γ. Actually,
n(Γ,⊥) is always a neighborhood of Γ. This follows from the presence of
N♦: any prime Γ does not contain ♦⊥ since ¬♦⊥ ∈ Γ and ⊥ /∈ Γ. 
Next, we will prove Theorem 5.7. Here, we identify a classical neigh-
borhood frame 〈W,N 〉 and an intuitionistic neighborhood frame 〈W,=, N 〉,
and similarly for a classical neighborhood model. The following is also im-
mediate from Lemma A.10.
Lemma A.12. A formula A ∈ L(,♦) is a theorem of IM+PEM+N♦
if and only if it is true in all normal classical neighborhood models.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that the canonical model of
IM + PEM + N♦ is a normal classical neighborhood model. Therefore,
completeness follows from Lemma A.10. Soundness is proved in the usual
way. 
So it suffices to prove that degenerate intuitionistic relational models
and normal classical neighborhood models determine the same logic. Ba-
sically this is done by mutual translations between models presented in
Section 4, but there is a subtle problem. If 〈N , V 〉 is a normal classi-
cal neighborhood model, then its translation is a degenerate intuitionistic
relational model, so this direction is straightforward. Consider the other
direction. If we have a degenerate intuitionistic relational model 〈R, V 〉, by
translation we obtain a model 〈NR, V 〉, which is not necessarily classical.
A neighborhood frame is classical when its ≤-part is the equality =, but in
this case this is not the case (it is only an equivalence relation).
Actually, this is not a big problem. We can fix this by considering
quotient of NR, which is indeed a classical neighborhood frame. In general,
we can prove the following:
Proposition A.13. Let N = 〈W,≤, N 〉 be an intuitionistic neighbor-
hood frame, and V an admissible N -valuation. Define its quotient |N | =
〈|W | , |≤| , |N |〉 and |V | as follows.
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• |W | = W/∼, where x ∼ y if and only if x ≤ y and y ≤ x.
• [x] |≤| [y] if and only if x ≤ y, where [z] denotes the equivalence class
of z. This does not depend on the choice of x and y.
• |N | ([x]) = {X/∼ | X ∈ N(x)}, where X/∼ is the image of X under
the canonical projection W → |W |. Since N is decreasing, x ∼ y
implies N(x) = N(y), so |N | is well-defined.
• |V | (p) = V (p)/∼.
Then, for any A ∈ L(,♦), we have
N , V, x n A ⇐⇒ |N| , |V | , [x] n A.
Proof. By induction on A. 
For any intuitionistic neighborhood frame N = 〈W,≤, N 〉, preorder
structure |≤| of its quotient |N | is clearly an order, that is, it is anti-
symmetric. In particular, when ≤ is an equivalence relation, |≤| is the
equality on the quotient |W |. Applying this construction to NR, we can
check that each degenerate intuitionistic relational model has an equiva-
lent normal classical neighborhood model |N |R. This completes the proof
of Theorem 5.7.
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